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Beijing’s Strategy for Pursuing a Deal While Managing the Risks of Disorder

In 2018, Chinese leader Xi Jinping argued that the world was undergoing “profound changes unseen in a century,” a concept that has since become central to Beijing’s geopolitical worldview. The phrase evoked parallels to the dramatic global shifts that followed World War I, including the collapse of European empires and the reordering of international politics. Today, Beijing perceives a similar seismic transformation, this time driven by accelerating technological breakthroughs—in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and quantum computing—coupled with the growing volatility in U.S. and European domestic politics, and a pronounced economic shift toward the Asia-Pacific region, largely driven by China’s own rapid development.

In 2018, Xi’s analysis might have looked premature. Today, his vision seems increasingly accurate. The Trump administration has launched trade wars with its key economic partners. Europe’s largest conflict since World War II continues in Ukraine, with the prospect of a lasting peace fragile and uncertain. The transatlantic alliance is straining under the weight of U.S. President Donald Trump’s explicit disdain for the European Union. Developments in AI and other emerging technologies, meanwhile, threaten to upend economies, societies, and geopolitical power structures in unprecedented and irreversible ways.

The question now is whether Beijing can exploit the global uncertainty to advance its interests with the United States and Europe—or if it will lose ground amid the turmoil. The U.S.-Chinese relationship, in theory, could stabilize through a “grand bargain” between Xi and Trump, which could reduce tensions on both trade and military issues. But entrenched mistrust between the two sides means that such an agreement—if it gets off the ground at all—risks collapsing into heightened great-power rivalry. In Europe, Beijing sees fresh opportunities to repair its relationships, as Trump’s antagonistic approach weakens transatlantic cohesion and tentative peace discussions in Ukraine raise the prospect of greater regional stability. Yet European leaders remain reluctant to pivot decisively toward China. And if peace talks in Ukraine break down, a renewed conflict would force Beijing into an uncomfortable choice between its European economic ambitions and its alignment with Russia under President Vladimir Putin.

Although careful diplomacy might let China pocket some short-term tactical successes, however Beijing plays its cards, the difficulty of winning over the deeply suspicious United States and Europe make it unlikely that Beijing will achieve lasting strategic gains in either relationship. It is in the rest of the world—in Latin America, Africa, and Asia—that China is most likely to reap the diplomatic benefits of U.S. retrenchment.

DEAL OR NO DEAL?

Forecasting the course of the second Trump administration’s relationship with Beijing is a tricky business, thanks to the mixed and often contradictory signals sent by Trump and his team. Trump’s cabinet features prominent figures, such as National Security Adviser Mike Waltz and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who, if given autonomy, would likely pursue intensified competition with China through measures such as tougher technology export controls and investment restrictions on Chinese firms, particularly in sensitive sectors such as AI and semiconductors. Before joining the administration, these officials supported increases in defense spending, a bolstered U.S. military presence in the Indo-Pacific, and cooperation with partners and allies to counter China’s growing influence. Several administration officials have also supported greater U.S. diplomatic and military backing for Taiwan, and some may be inclined to put political pressure on the Chinese Communist Party by highlighting human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Hong Kong and shortcomings in the party’s domestic governance. In effect, they advocate a continuation of the highly competitive approach that prevailed in the latter half of Trump’s first presidency.

Yet Trump himself has more idiosyncratic views on China. On the campaign trail last year, he called for a 60 percent tariff rate on Chinese imports, and since taking office, he has placed tariffs totaling 20 percent on Chinese goods, with the possibility of more on the way after a comprehensive trade review is concluded in early April. The Trump administration has unveiled its sweeping (if still aspirational) “America First Investment Policy,” which would scale back Chinese investment in the United States and U.S. investment in China. But Trump has also extolled his personal relationship with Xi, saying just after his second inauguration, “I like President Xi very much. I’ve always liked him.” One of Trump’s first acts after returning to office was to direct the Justice Department not to enforce a law banning the social media app TikTok in the United States until its Chinese parent company, ByteDance, sells it to a U.S. entity. He has also said that he would welcome more Chinese investment in the United States, making him one of the sole elected officials to take such a stance publicly.

Trump’s recent claim that he plans to meet with Xi in the “not too distant future” seemingly presents Beijing with an opportunity. A potential grand bargain with the Trump administration might entail a substantial reduction in, or even a cessation of, U.S. tariffs, an easing of U.S. export controls on advanced technology, and expanded Chinese investments in key U.S. sectors. Such an arrangement would offer Beijing significant economic relief, reduced geopolitical tensions, and greater bilateral stability. And given Trump’s previous criticisms of Taipei—such as his accusation that Taiwan “stole” the U.S. semiconductor industry—and his aversion to foreign entanglements, he might even be amenable to negotiating concessions on Taiwan. In Beijing’s eyes, Trump’s eagerness to improve relations with Putin, his antagonism toward traditional U.S. allies, and his apparent disregard for the domestic political repercussions of his trade war show that he is far less constrained by the traditional boundaries of U.S. foreign policy than previous leaders have been.

At the same time, many things could derail a grand bargain before it materializes. Although Trump’s transactional and erratic approach offers short-term tactical openings to Beijing, any deal that Trump signs will be inherently unstable. For one, China may not be able to hold up its end of any bargain. If Trump makes maximalist economic demands on rebalancing trade, dialing back China’s industrial subsidies, or revaluing the yuan, China will find it difficult to follow through on such commitments, if it agrees to them at all. On the U.S. side, Trump’s unpredictable policy shifts, erratic negotiating style, and uncertain domestic political standing mean that any agreement reached might unravel before it can be implemented. A similar story played out in Trump’s first term. Chinese officials initially underestimated Trump’s willingness to escalate economic tensions, dismissing his threats as mere campaign rhetoric. Then, when Trump imposed tariffs on Chinese goods in late 2019, Beijing found itself scrambling to respond, eventually settling for limited concessions in the Phase One trade deal in early 2020. But even those modest gains quickly evaporated amid the COVID-19 pandemic, as Trump blamed China for the outbreak and allowed his subordinates wide latitude to pursue aggressive policies toward Beijing.

Furthermore, if China fails to reach a deal with Trump on trade and tariffs, that will likely end the prospects for a quasi-détente, as Beijing will not have a chance to move on to other issues. Without a deal in the near term, China hawks in Trump’s administration will likely have an opening to push hard against Beijing, leading to tougher sanctions, broader technology export restrictions, intensified military posturing in the Indo-Pacific, and stronger diplomatic support for Taiwan.

ENTENTE OR ESCALATION?

Beijing’s prospects for reconciliation in Europe are similarly limited, although the downside risks are smaller. China’s consistent support for Russia’s war effort, combined with years of aggressive political, diplomatic, and economic pressure on European states, has eroded its position across much of the continent. The EU has criticized Beijing for enabling Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine by exporting technology and helping sustain the Russian economy, softening the bite of Western sanctions. China’s joint military exercises and defense consultations with Russia have heightened European concerns about the long-term security threat on Europe’s eastern flank. Even European businesses that once saw China as a critical market have started reassessing the scope and scale of their investments in the country.

Trump’s disputes with Europe, coupled with a potential settlement in Ukraine, certainly present Beijing with a short window to repair its relationships on the continent. Although Beijing has remained on the sidelines of the negotiations the Trump administration is conducting with Moscow and Kyiv, it is exploring opportunities to engage if a cease-fire is agreed upon. Despite its strong partnership with Russia, China has managed to preserve relations with Ukraine, which in turn has carefully managed diplomatic ties in the hope that China might eventually use its influence to restrain Russia from pursuing even more aggressive options.

Chinese support could be valuable to a postwar Ukraine. If a lasting cease-fire or peace arrangement can be established, reconstruction could cost more than $500 billion, according to a recent estimate by the European Commission, the Ukrainian government, the UN, and the World Bank. Few countries are as well positioned as China to support Ukraine’s post-conflict development. Beijing would be happy to play this role, given the relatively limited risks involved and the prospect of using financial support for Ukraine to advance China’s economic, technological, and strategic interests in Europe. China has a well-developed toolkit of state-owned enterprises, private firms, and state-bank lending that can bring financing, operational capability, personnel, and technology to developing countries, as shown by its Belt and Road Initiative. Indeed, Kyiv has already turned to Beijing for just that kind of help. Last year, a senior official led a delegation of Ukrainian companies to Beijing to ask “Chinese companies to take a more active part in helping Ukraine, in particular in developing trade and investment relations.” If a peace deal is reached, expect many more such visits.

Participation in Ukrainian reconstruction efforts would not, by itself, mend China’s relations with Europe, but peace in Ukraine would eliminate a significant source of tension. Already, Xi has worked to capitalize on the fracturing of the transatlantic alliance, dispatching Chinese diplomats across the European continent to promote China as a reliable alternative partner, emphasizing opportunities for stable economic cooperation and criticizing perceived U.S. unreliability and unilateralism. For now, this outreach remains largely rhetorical, but it is setting the groundwork for deeper economic and diplomatic initiatives down the line. An end to the war in Ukraine could allow China to move forward with long-stalled goals, such as by reopening talks on a major EU-Chinese investment deal, the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, which was put on ice in 2021.

A thoroughgoing European reorientation toward China, however, would require Beijing to change its behavior to a far greater extent. In particular, it would need to curb what Europe sees as China’s industrial overcapacity and distance itself from Moscow. The Chinese market no longer possesses the gravitational pull it once did, thanks to a slowdown in domestic growth, sluggish consumer spending, and a more interventionist and ideological party-state. Beijing now actively competes with European economies, especially Germany’s. And rather than expecting Trump’s overtures to Russia to peel Moscow and Beijing apart, Europe understands that China will remain Russia’s “decisive enabler,” as a NATOstatement described it last year. Unless Beijing overhauls these unpopular policies—which it seems unwilling or unable to do—China cannot realistically expect major gains in Europe.

Even modest progress could stall and China’s relations with Europe could deteriorate if lasting peace in Ukraine proves elusive and violence escalates. An intensified conflict would force China into an unenviable choice between distancing itself from Russia, thereby alienating a crucial partner, and openly increasing its military and economic support for Moscow, removing any remaining European doubts about China’s complicity in the war in Ukraine. Beijing would then see its room for diplomatic maneuver sharply constrained across the continent.

Ultimately, the best Beijing may hope to achieve in its relationships with the United States and Europe could be to limit the substantial downside risks of the present disorder. But Beijing is better positioned to make gains elsewhere. The Trump administration’s unconventional and unpredictable foreign policy is creating openings in Africa, Latin America, and among China’s Asian neighbors. Long-standing U.S. allies and partners in these regions may not pivot decisively toward China, but Trump’s actions, including abrupt withdrawals from international agreements, wavering security commitments, and erratic economic policies, are compelling many to reconsider their dependence on Washington. As countries hedge against potential U.S. retrenchment, Beijing stands ready to present itself as a dependable partner. The “profound changes” that Xi sees in Europe and the United States may not yet have provided Beijing with the chance to reimagine its relationships with the West, but the story across the rest of the globe may prove quite different.

Jude Blanchette is Distinguished Tang Chair in China Research at RAND and Director of the RAND China Research Center.

Excerpts: Foreign Affairs